Addressing the Financial Crisis Requires Improvements in Equity by dos Santos, Paulo
The contents of this Development Viewpoint reflect the views 
of the author(s) and not necessarily those of CDPR or SOAS.
Centre for Development Policy and Research 
SOAS, University of London
Thornhaugh Street, Russell Square, London WC1H 
www. soas.ac.uk/cdpr
Telephone: +44 (0)207 898 4496
Centre for Development 
Policy and Research
School of Oriental and African Studies
            Addressing the Financial Crisis Requires 
                          Improvements in Equity 
by Paulo Dos Santos, Research on Money and Finance, Department of Economics, SOAS
At the heart of the current financial crisis lies a massive overextension 
of credit to US households, whose debt reached a record 133 per cent of their 
disposable income in 2007 (see Figure). This condition arose not so much from 
‘failures’ in financial markets, instruments or regulation, but as a consequence of 
two related underlying processes that have pushed up individual borrowing in 
many economies over the past 20 years.
First, lending and the selling of financial services to individuals have developed as 
central lines of business for leading banks. Credit to individuals reached almost 50 
per cent of all balance-sheet lending of US commercial banks in 2006. Citigroup 
and Bank of America committed, for example, over three quarters of their loan 
portfolios to such lending. 
Through such services, financial intermediaries have tapped directly into the 
income of wage earners as a source of profits (See Lapavitsas, 2009, and dos Santos, 
2009). These practices proved disastrous in real estate markets in the aftermath of 
the dot.com crash. The high relative profitability of mortgage lending fueled an 
expansion of aggregate credit that led to speculative price bubbles. 
Financial innovation accompanied this tend. Firms adopted new instruments that 
appeared to allow the safe expansion of lending to poor and minority borrowers 
with low and uncertain incomes. Lured by high returns, banks and investment 
funds exercised scant scrutiny of the new instruments that they bought through 
risky, highly leveraged positions. Yet their profits hinged on predatory mortgages 
that could be paid only if home prices continued to rise indefinitely. 
Rising Debt
Second, US administrations led by both political parties supported rising individual 
debt and homeownership as central tools for achieving macroeconomic and 
social stability. After the 1990-91 recession, the US economy became increasingly 
dependent on consumption. From 1991 to 2005, household consumption and 
residential investment rose from 69.6 per cent of GDP to a record 76.4 per cent, 
while the declared income of the bottom 90 per cent of the population fell from 36 
to 32 per cent of GDP.
This trend could be sustained only by increased borrowing by the majority of the 
population. Household borrowing grew from less than two per cent to over 10 per 
cent of GDP over the same period (see Figure). Rising home prices and ownership 
rates were vital in this regard since they provided a growing collateral base for 
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borrowing. And they were aggressively encouraged with state support for 
mortgage lending and, particularly after 2001, very low interest rates.
This expansion soon extended to ‘subprime’ markets, where mortgage lending 
was also supported for political reasons. Promoting ‘market-based’ housing 
policies, Democratic senators urged Freddie Mac in 2006 to be more aggressive 
in helping poor and minority households buy into the housing boom. Similarly, 
Alan Greenspan claimed in his autobiography that ‘government encouragement 
of subprime mortgage programs enabled many members of minority groups 
to become first-time home buyers…and this boded well for the cohesion of the 
nation.’ 
Reform Measures
Given the deep structural and policy roots of the current crisis, recovery from it will 
require more than simple reforms in regulations and financial instruments. Three 
measures, which challenge the recent policy consensus in rich and developing 
countries, could help usher in economic recovery. 
First, real improvements in the distribution of income are needed. As happened in 
the 1920s, rising inequality fueled mass borrowing by low-income households in 
recent decades. As the Figure shows, lending to households in the US has plunged 
since 2006 to levels last seen in 1970, threatening to precipitate significant falls in 
consumption and aggregate demand. Unless real incomes improve for the majority 
of households, this process will become painfully protracted and prolong economic 
recession. Increases in unemployment benefits, real wage gains and progressive tax 
cuts are vital to the restoration of economic stability.  
Second, the public provision of housing, pensions, education and health care 
needs to replace private provision through capital markets. Privatisation of these 
services has passed onto individuals not only their costs, but also the financial risks 
associated with illness, labour-market uncertainty, and instability of investment. In 
order to manage these risks and access basic services, wage earners have had to 
make sizeable payments to financial firms. As millions now lose homes, retirement 
savings and jobs, the need for quality public alternatives in housing and pensions 
has become evident.
Finally, mass public investment programmes that bolster both demand and 
productivity are critically needed. For decades many governments have sought 
to prop up sagging economies with an iniquitous form of ‘Keynesianism’, namely, 
encouraging wage earners to bolster demand through increasing their debt. This 
regime forced wage earners to bear the burden of demand management while 
helping make financial firms highly profitable. As the current crisis shows, such 
economic policies have proved to be not only inequitable, but also untenable.
These measures point clearly towards adopting purposive economic management 
aimed at ensuring equitable economic development as the chief tool for recovery 
from this crisis.  For three decades such intervention has been dismissed on 
dogmatic grounds. The time is ripe for putting it back on the agenda as the best 
means to ensure the efficient fulfillment of social needs and balanced economic 
growth.
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